Production Response to Increased Imports: The Case of U.S. Sugar by Kennedy, P. Lynn & Schmitz, Andrew
Production Response to Increased Imports:
The Case of U.S. Sugar
P. Lynn Kennedy and Andrew Schmitz
This paper considers how the welfare of U.S. sugar producers can be affected by the use of
production controls in the presence of rising sugar imports and falling sugar prices, taking
into account the negative externalities associated with U.S. sugar production. Even if pro-
duction controls are used, producer welfare can be affected negatively under rising imports.
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Under competitive conditions, increased im-
ports result in import-competing producers
cutting production as prices fall. As a result,
producers suffer economic losses. There are
many cases in which producers do not act
competitively in response to increased imports.
For example, the Canadian supply-management
system runs counter to a competitive supply
model in which producers practice supply
management through production controls in
the presence of imports (Katz, Bruneau, and
Schmitz, 2008; Schmitz, 1983; Schmitz, 2008;
Schmitz,Coffin,andRosaasen,1996). In theory,
at least, producers maximize profits subject
to various levels of imports (Vercammen and
Schmitz, 1992). Supply management has also
been discussed with reference to the U.S. sug-
ar industry and was implemented under the
Payment-in-Kind sugar program. With rising
domestic and world prices in early 2000, in part
due to natural disasters, the discussion over the
use of sugar-production controls died. However,
in 2007, with falling sugar prices coupled with
rising imports, the discussion over the use of
production controls in sugar had again surfaced.
U.S. sugar producers, for example, were being
pressured through the sugar portion of the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),
which allowed for free trade in sugar by the end
of 2008. U.S. imports of sugar from Mexico
have increased sharply since 2005. The question
the industry must consider is: Can U.S. pro-
ducers offset the losses from increased imports
by restricting production? Even if they could,
there are major issues to consider before pro-
ducers would opt for a supply-management
scheme. Regardless, certain producers would
never opt for such a scheme.
For internationally traded commodities,
import-quota rents can take various forms.
They can go to thegovernment in the importing
country, to producers, to private importers, or
to exporters. For example, for sugar exports to
the United States, quota rents go to sugar ex-
porters,butonly tothosewith preferentialstatus
(Schmitz, Schmitz, and Seale, 2003). A related
question that the industry must consider is:
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presence of domestic production controls? In
this paper, we discuss how export-quota rents
and U.S. producer welfarewould be affected by
the use of production controls in the presence
of rising sugar imports and falling sugar prices,
taking into account negative externalities as-
sociated with U.S. sugar production. Even if
production controls are used, producer welfare
can be affected negatively under rising imports.
We also show in this paper that export quota
rents increase under supply management.
Theoretical Considerations
The U.S. sugar program supports the price of
sugar in the United States through the operation
of a tariff-rate quota (TRQ). The TRQ on sugar
in the United States is set to guarantee a do-
mestic sugar price of 18 cents per pound on raw
sugar and 22.9 cents per pound on sugar refined
from sugar beets.
The TRQ is based on two different sugar
quota rates. The first quota rate is essentially
zero and allows for a basic minimum access to
the domestic market. The second quota-rate is
typically prohibitive. In Figure 1, the excess
supply and excess demand of sugar in the U.S.
market are depicted using the small country
assumption. The kinked excess-supply curve
(abcd) follows the world price pw at quantities
below the fixed import quota q* and moves to
the world price plus the over-quota tariff pw 1 t
at levels greater than q*. The effective excess-
supply curve is discontinuous at the minimum-
access quantity, which results in the domestic
market price of pq. The goal of the U.S. sugar
program is to provide support to the domestic
sugar price. Given a fixed import quota of q*,
the over-quota tariff leads to the domestic price
being capped at pw 1 t in the small country
case. Ifconditions wereto lead tothe difference
in domestic and world prices being equal to or
greater than this out-of-quota tariff, then im-
ports would expand beyond those of the initial
TRQ of, for example, q*.1
In addition to the TRQ, the Food, Conser-
vation, and Energy Act of 2008 includes a
nonrecourse loan program to provide a floor for
domestically produced raw sugar from sugar-
cane. The operation of this particular loan
program is complicated by the Dole Amend-
ment of the 1985 U.S. Farm Bill, which re-
quires that the sugar program be conducted at
no cost to the U.S. Treasury. One result of the
Dole Amendment is that payments under the
loan-rate provisions for sugar are made using
payments-in-kind.
We present a trade model that contains both
U.S. import quotas and domestic-production
controls (Figure 2). Domestic demand is given
by the curve D
0, and domestic supply is given
by S. (Here it is assumed there are no negative
externalities associated with production, but
this assumption is relaxed later.) Under free
trade, the domestic border price is pb, domestic
production is Q1, and domestic consumption is
Q2. Imports total Q2 2 Q1.
Suppose, however, as in the case of U.S.
sugar, that free trade is not attainable. Imports
are restricted by the use of quotas. First, we
restrict imports to Q92 – Q91 by means of an
import quota. This restriction of imports in-
creases the domestic price to p1, increasing
domestic production to Q91, and decreases do-
mestic consumption to Q92. Producers gain
producer surplus p1pbab while consumers lose
consumer surplus p1pbyx (Vercammen and
Schmitz, 1992).
Figure 1. Tariff-Rate Quota Program for U.S.
Sugar
1Under the small country assumption, the out-of-
quota tariff provides a cap on the U.S. domestic price.
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management in the presence of import quotas?
Consider an import quota in the amount of
Q92 – Q91. Domestic producers now face the
demand curve D
0. For domestic producers to
maximize profits, the production quota is set at
that point where the marginal revenue curve
MR equals the supply curve S, which results in
domestic production of Q1. (Note: we have
used two instruments—import quotas and
production quotas). By imposing production
controls, producers gain area p1cfp2 – abc rela-
tivetotheirgainfromimportcontrolsalone.The
total gain for producers is the entire area pbafp2
from joint production and import controls.
Consumers lose the entire area pbygp2 as a
result of the combined production and import
controls. The absolute size of the loss depends
on the size of the import quota in place. Im-
porters gain area fckg as a result of production
controls. However, if the quota depresses world
prices below pb (e.g., p0), then the importers
earn additional rents of ahij. Generally, where
this type of model applies, the quota rents re-
side with importers who are usually processors
of the product being imported (Vercammen and
Schmitz, 1992). However, in the case of sugar,
the exporters receive the quota rents.
The availability of import-quota rents gives
importers/exporters incentives for rent-seeking
behavior because import quotas have a value
equal to fajg under the small-country assump-
tion and a value of fhig under the large-country
case. This value arises because importers, for
example, buy a product at pb and sell it in the
domestic market at p2. Alternatively, exporters
sell at p2, at a supply price of pb.
With the framework of Figure 2, one can
model the outcome of various import quota
levels. For convenience, we illustrated only a
quota of size Q92 – Q91. By varying the size of
imports, one can show that, at a certain level of
imports, supply management can no longer
compensate for the erosion in producer rents
from freer trade.
The above outcome isessentially a producer-
monopoly solution in which producers have
market power through the ability to set prices
or they are given market power through legis-
lation that allows them to practice supply man-
agement (this is the case in Canadian supply
management). Our results assume competitive
behavior on the part of U.S. sugar producers,
and consider what the impact would be under a
sugar supply-management scheme introduced
in response to rising imports. This article is
motivated by the fact that increased sugar imports
depress internal U.S. sugar prices. To main-
tain the U.S. sugar-producer-support prices at
current levels at no cost to the government, the
problem of how to deal with overproduction
can arise.
In our modeling efforts, we consider the
joint effect of increased imports and the intro-
duction of production controls. There are cases
when the loss to producers from freer trade can
be more than offset by the gains from the in-
troduction of supply management. However,
this does not always need to be the case. Con-
sider Figure 3f, where we compare autarky to
trade equal to q1 – q2. The autarky price and
quantity are p1 and q1, respectively. Suppose
imports are allowed in the amount of q1 – q2 at
a price p3. Producers lose p1afp3 under com-
petitiveconditions. Clearly, producers loseeven
more if free trade is allowed, given a free trade
price of p0. With supply management, pro-
ducers restrict output to q3 and charge price p2.
However, could the introduction of pro-
duction controls in the presence of an increase
in imports offset the loss that occurs under
competitive conditions? Given an import quota
of q1 – q2, producers lose acd – p1dep2 relative
Figure 2. Import Quotas and Domestic Pro-
duction Controls
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ducers lose p1afp3 (Figure 3). Even with supply
management, producer welfare remains below
that of no trade, since acd is greater than
p1dep2. If free trade is allowed, then producer
welfare will be further reduced, even in the
presence of supply management. This can be
seen with reference to the free trade, supply-
managed demand curve D2. One can also
compare trading situations. For example, it is
possible to trace out the effects of allowing
imports to increase from q1 – q2 to the free-
trade level with production restricted through
supply management.
Empirical Results
Previous analyses have modeled the impact of
increased sugar-import quotas on the U.S. sugar
market. For example, Petrolia and Kennedy
(2003) use Modele Internationale Simplified
de Simulation to analyze increases in the U.S.
sugar TRQ to determine the impact of in-
creased exports from Cuba and Mexico. While
their framework allows for the use of produc-
tion and import quotas to be used as policy
instruments, it does not allow for the simulta-
neous use of both.
For the purposes of this analysis, a partial-
equilibrium framework is developed to deter-
mine the profit-maximizing production quota
given a specific import-quota level. Our model
considers the United States as a small country
relative to the rest of the world.2 Three sectors
are utilized within this framework: domestic
production, imports, and domestic consump-
tion. Domestic consumption QC is comprised
of products produced domestically, QS and/or
imported QM, such that:
(1) QC 5QS 1QM,
where QM is determined exogenously by the
domestic government through their choice of
TRQ level.3
In the absence of the ability to restrict sup-
ply, the domestic price will adjust to changes in
QM, which will result in producers adjusting QS
based on their supply function, and consumers
adjusting QC based on their demand function.
A market-clearing price will be achieved when
QS and QC, resulting from the new QM, meet
the conditions in Equation (1).
The welfare implications of supply man-
agement are examined by allowing producers
to restrict production (Figures 1 and 2). Through
the restriction of domestic supply, producers
are able to increase the price they receive for
their product. By producing at a point where
marginal revenue equals marginal cost, pro-
ducers are able to maximize profit.
Simulations are conducted in this analysis
for alternative quota levels and for alternative
supply and demand elasticities using Microsoft
Excel. Given the observed supply and demand
quantities at the base-price level, linear supply
and demand is used to determine: (1) the mar-
ket clearing equilibrium in the absence of
supply management given a specific import
quota and (2) the profit-maximizing production
quota and corresponding equilibrium given a
specific import quota. The domestic quanti-
ties and prices are then used to calculate the
Figure 3. Producer Impact of Production and
Import Controls
2The United States accounts for approximately six
percent of the world centrifugal sugar demand, and
less from a supply perspective. Given this, our analysis
uses the small-country assumption for the United
States in modeling the welfare impacts of the import
quota.
3The TRQ employed by the United States uses a
tariff of zero for all in-quota imports, and a prohibitive
over-quota tariff structure. The over-quota tariff be-
comes non-prohibitive, given a sufficient decrease in
world price and/or an increase in U.S. price.
Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, December 2009 780respective changes in producer and consumer
surplus resulting from each scenario.
The base-level raw-sugar quantities and
prices used in these simulations are based on
2004/2005 data obtained from the Sugar and
Sweeteners Outlook (United States Department
of Agriculture, 2007). Total U.S. demand was
9.079 million metric tons (mmt), which was
comprised of 7.597 mmt from domestic pro-
duction and 1.482 mmt from imports. The
status quo price of raw sugar was U.S. 22.92
cents per pound ($505.30 per metric ton, mt).
The base-level-import quota, used as the
status quo in this analysis, was 1.482 mmt.
Various scenarios were developed, based on
alternative policy strategies, to expand the level
of imported sugar by expanding the import
quota. The minimum expansion was based on
Dominican Republic - Central American Free
Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA) provisions of
an additional 100 thousand metric tons (tmt).
Other scenarios considered include expansion
of the base-level-import quota by 500; 1,000;
and 2,000 tmt.
The literature shows U.S. own-price sugar
supply elasticities ranging from 0.10 to 0.70
(Lopez, 1989; Lopez, 1990; Tyers and Anderson,
1992). Gardiner, Roningen, and Liu (1989)
used an aggregate own-price sugar supply
elasticity of 0.50, which we adopt in this
analysis. Demand elasticities, in the literature,
range from 20.10 to 20.60 (Gardiner et al.,
1989; Lopez, 1989; Lopez, 1990; Tyers and
Anderson, 1992; Uri and Boyd, 1999). Based
on these estimates, we employ demand elas-
ticities of 20.10, 20.30, and 20.60.
Import-Quota Levels
Weshowtheimpactsofalternativeimport-quota
levels when the sugar industry does not practice
supply management (Table 1). In these scenar-
ios, the domestic market price adjusts to achieve
equilibria where domestic production plus im-
portsequaldomestic consumption.These results
show consistently that an increase in the total
import quota causes: (1) the market-clearing
price to decline, (2) market-clearing production



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Kennedy and Schmitz: Production Response to Increased Imports 781example, given a demand elasticity of 20.3 and
a supply elasticity of 0.5, producer rents fall by
roughly $1 billion for an increase in imports of
2.0 mmt to 3,482 tmt. On the other hand, con-
sumers gain roughly U.S. $1.5 billion from ex-
panded imports.
A more elastic demand elasticity tends to
lessen the decrease in the domestic price and to
lessen the decrease in domestic production,
resulting in smaller losses in producer welfare.
Consider the results presented in Table 1,
holding the supply elasticity constant at 0.5.
The initial domestic price, given the status quo
import quota of 1,482 tmt, remains at 22.92
cents per pound. Adoption of an import quota
in the amount of 1,982 tmt results in a decrease
in the domestic price to 20.49 cents per pound
based on a demand elasticity of 20.1, but falls
to only 21.68 cents per pound with the more
elastic demand elasticity of 20.6. Corre-
spondingly, production decreases to 7,193 tmt
with a demand elasticity of 20.1, but only
decreases to 7,392 tmt with the more elastic
demand elasticity of 20.6. At the same time,
producer surplus decreases from U.S. $2.88
billion to U.S. $2.48 billion with the smaller
demand elasticity but decreases to only U.S.
$2.67 billion with the larger demand elasticity.
Supply Management
The impact of alternative import quota levels
when the U.S. sugar industry utilizes supply
management is shown in Table 2. In these
scenarios, the domestic industry selects a pro-
duction level to maximize producer surplus,
given a specific import quota level (the model
developed in Figure 2). Depending on the
supply and demand elasticities used in the
scenario, increasing the import quota reduces a
producer’s ability to extract rents. Eventually, a
point is reached at which supply management
cannot compensate for increases in the import
quota. For example, for a demand elasticity of
20.3 and a supply elasticity of 0.5, supply
management is able to improve producer welfare
even if the import quota increasesfrom1.48 mmt
to 3.48 mmt. However, for a demand elasticity
of 20.6 and a supply elasticity of 0.5, producer






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, December 2009 7823.48 mmt even in the presence of supply man-
agement, given the initial starting point of 1.48
mmt coupled with production controls.4 How-
ever, without supply management, the loss to
producers from increased imports is roughly four
times as great when comparing Tables 1 and 2.
The Erosion of Industry Rents
Figure 4 demonstrates the erosion of the
industry’s ability to achieve its initial welfare
status as the import quota increases. We com-
pare the change in producer surplus under
profit-maximizing supply management for al-
ternative import-quota levels in relation to the
producer surplus obtained with the initial im-
port quota and market clearing conditions. As
shown in Figure 4, scenarios are analyzed in
which the demand elasticity is held constant at
0.5, utilizing alternative demand elasticities
of 20.01, 20.3, and 20.6. The ability of a
country to improve its producer welfare through
supply management decreases as the import
quota level increases, with a decreased ability to
enhance producer surplus as the demand elas-
ticity becomes more elastic. This figure indi-
cates that, given a demand elasticityof20.6,the
United States loses the ability to use supply
management to achieve its status quo producer
surplus level as the import quota approaches
three mmt.
In contrast, consumer welfare increases
as the total import quota is expanded. Figure 5
demonstrates the improvement in consumer
welfare for three alternative demand elasticities
as the import quota expands from 1,482 tmt. An
interesting point related to this figure stems
from production limitations due to the over-
quota tariff. Throughout the scenario using
the 20.1 demand elasticity and at lower import
quota levels of the 20.3 demand elasticity
scenario, the use of supply management is
limited by the provisions of the over-quota
tariff; the use of supply management to in-
crease the domestic price beyond 44.69 cents
per pound results in increased access of foreign
sugar, which undermines the supply manage-
ment program. The profit maximization strat-
egy under supply management of producing up
to the point where additional imports could
enter the United States under the over-quota
tariff keeps consumer welfare constant as the
import quota expands. When the over-quota
tariff is not an issue in determining the supply
management production level, consumer wel-
fare improves as the import quota increases.
Sugar versus High-Fructose Corn Syrup
Demand
In the above analysis, we assume that there is
no shift in the basic relationship between the
Figure 4. Change in Producer Surplus from
Status Quo Market Clearing Conditions Given
Alternative Supply Elasticities
Figure 5. Change in Producer Surplus from
Status Quo Market Clearing Conditions Given
Alternative Demand Elasticities
4See Appendix Figure A for calculations based on
demand and supply elasticities of 20.6 and 0.5.
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Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS). Historically,
roughly 50% of the U.S. sweetener market has
been made up of HFCS. However, this may no
longer be the case as the demand for sugar
might increase in the United States relative to
HFCS. This is in large part because of the sharp
increase in corn prices in 2007. Corn is the key
ingredient in the production of HFCS. Because
of the price increase for corn, HFCS prices
have also increased and, for the first time in
history, HFCS prices are equivalent to sugar
prices (Figure 6). If the suggested increase in
demand for sugar relative to HFCS does occur,
then at least part of the increase in sugar im-
ports from Mexico will be absorbed in the
sweetener market without depressing sugar
prices (Castillo, Bucaram, and Schmitz, 2008).
Limitations
There are two important issues not dealt with in
the above analysis: (1) the environmental im-
pacts of freer trade and (2) the benefits from
sugarcane processing. A claim is often made
that negative externalities are associated with
sugar production, especially with sugarcane
production. We show the results from pro-
duction controls if indeed there is a divergence
between private and social marginal production
costs. Including these externalities as costs to
the industry will result in an upward shift in the
supply curve. It is important to note that our
analysis hinges on the assumption, rather than
on empirical evidence, that there are negative
externalities.
In Figure 7 we illustrate the impact of
negative externalities in relation to the U.S.
sugar program. The private marginal cost curve
of the sugar industry is SP while the corre-
sponding social marginal costis SS.An increase
in imports from q1 – q2 to q3 – q4 lowers pro-
ducer welfare, but results in a positive societal
gain of abcd. In addition, under supply man-
agement, output is restricted to qm, and results
in an additional welfare benefit of dcef.
Table 3 presents results considering both a
10%and20%increaseincosts,givenalternative
import quota levels. As expected, both scenarios
show a decrease in the optimal production quota
as the supply curve moves to the left. This re-
sults in an increase in domestic prices.
The trends within each of the three sce-
narios are consistent, with an increase in the
import quota resulting in a decline in do-
mestic price levels and decreased domestic
Figure 6. HFCS-42 and Sugar Prices (cents per pound); September 1997–September 2007
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management is employed. What is striking is
the difference between scenarios. In the case
that does not account for negative externalities
(the initial supply schedule), prices are shown
to be lower and production levels are shown to
be higher than in the alternative scenarios. As
producers account for various negative exter-
nalities in their production decisions, including
environmental degradation, there is a tendency
toward decreasing production levels. At the
same time, domestic prices are higher across-
the-board as producers account for additional
costs of production.
The data presented in Table 3 show how the
socially optimal production levels deviate from
the private outcomes. From this it is possible to
measure the additional producer gains that are
generated from negative externalities. Also, it
is clear that a move toward freer trade is con-
sistent with environmental groups’ concerns
over environmental degradation, given that in-
creased market access results in decreased do-
mestic production.
Processor Rents
In our empirical work, we estimate the impact
of U.S. policy changes on sugar-producer
welfare, but we ignore the sugar-refining sec-
tor. The majority of U.S. imported sugar is in
raw form and is further processed in the United
States by the sugar companies, Imperial and
Domino. Added sugar imports result in more
processing for these two. However, concerning
the U.S. sugar sector in total, an increase in raw
sugar imports occurs along with a decrease in
domestic sugar production. But the combi-
nation of imports and domestic production
available for processing increases (Table 4),
Figure 7. Trade and Negative Externalities
Table 3. Optimal U.S. Sugar Production Quota Levels and Corresponding Price Data with Alterna-
tive Supply Schedules, Supply Elasticity of 0.5, and Demand Elasticity of 20.6
Total Import Quota (1,000 mt)
1,482 1,582 1,982 2,482 3,482
Initial Supply Schedule
Profit maximizing production quota (1,000 mt) 5,385 5,356 5,239 5,094 4,802
Domestic price with production quota (cents/lb) 32.23 31.93 30.74 29.25 26.26
Market clearing production level (1,000 mt) 7,597 7,556 7,392 7,186 6,775
Market clearing price (cents/lb) 22.92 22.67 21.68 20.44 17.96
10% Cost Increase
Profit maximizing production quota (1,000 mt) 5,169 5,141 5,029 4,889 4,610
Domestic price with production quota (cents/lb) 33.14 32.83 31.62 30.10 27.07
Market clearing production level (1,000 mt) 7,174 7,136 6,980 6,786 6,398
Market clearing price (cents/lb) 24.70 24.44 23.41 22.12 19.55
20% Cost Increase
Profit maximizing production quota (1,000 mt) 4,970 4,943 4,835 4,701 4,432
Domestic price with production quota (cents/lb) 33.97 33.67 32.44 30.90 27.82
Market clearing production level (1,000 mt) 6,796 6,759 6,612 6,429 6,061
Market clearing price (cents/lb) 26.29 26.02 24.96 23.63 20.97
Kennedy and Schmitz: Production Response to Increased Imports 785with the exception being the case where the
over-quota tariff is a constraint. Therefore the
amount of processing activity increases for
processors of cane sugar. Because the total
volume of U.S. processed sugar increases,
processors gain regardless of decreasing, con-
stant, or increasing returns to scale, with gains
being greatest with increasing returns to scale.
Impacts vary according to firm size, with the
industry made up of processors ranging from
small sugar beet factories to very large sugar-
cane processors.
If sugar production is restricted, processors
lose unless they can increase sugar processing
from additional imports of raw sugar. But this
would be possible only for processors of cane
sugar, not processors of beet sugar. Given this,
the welfare of beet processors would decline.
The U.S. sugarcane industry is highly inte-
grated. Two sugar entities in Florida, Flo-Sun,
Inc. and U.S. Sugar Corporation, are integrated
vertically from the farm to the refinery level
(Moss and Schmitz, 2002). As such, these sugar
producers maximize rents from both produc-
tion and from sugar refining. This is not the
case, however, for producers in Louisiana,
where there is less integration between sugar
producers and raw-sugar-mill owners. Thus
there are three cases to consider when inter-
preting our empirical results: (1) beet proces-
sors lose from various forms of production
controls, (2) nonintegrated cane processors
gain since the loss due to decreased domestic
processing is more than offset by the increase
in the processing of imported sugar, and (3)
integrated cane processors gain from added
processing and from their production activities.
Therefore, in aggregate, the processing sector
gains in this framework, implying that the
overall welfare effects of supply management
are understated.
Conclusion
Many producers of import-competing commod-
ities are pressured by government policies that
allow for freer trade. We have demonstrated
that supply management in sugar can lessen the
impact of increased sugar imports into the
United States. However, thereisa point at which
supply management can no longer compensate
producers for the negative impacts of increased
import quotas. Although this analysis has shown
that supply management could be beneficial to
the U.S. sugar industry to mitigate the impact
of increased imports, we recognize that many
U.S. sugar producers would likely not support
a Canadian-type supply-management system
for sugar. On the other hand, such a system
would likely be supported by environmental
groups. However, under a supply-management
system, there are many difficult issues, includ-
ing the allocation of production quotas among
producers.
It is important to reiterate the sensitivity of
our results to the price elasticity of demand.
Table 4. U.S. Production, Imports, and Product Available for Processing under Alternative Supply
Management Strategies
Demand/Supply Elasticities
Total Import Quota (1,000 mt)
1,482 1,582 1,982 2,482 3,482
20.1/0.5 Domestic production (1,000 mt) 6,735 6,635 6,235 5,735 4,735
Imports (1,000 mt) 1,482 1,582 1,982 2,482 3,482
Product for processing (1,000 mt) 8,217 8,217 8,217 8,217 8,217
20.3/0.5 Domestic production (1,000 mt) 5,010 4,910 4,617 4,433 4,065
Imports (1,000 mt) 1,482 1,582 1,982 2,482 3,482
Product for processing (1,000 mt) 6,492 6,492 6,599 6,915 7,547
20.6/0.5 Domestic production (1,000 mt) 4,801 4,764 4,617 4,433 4,065
Imports (1,000 mt) 1,482 1,582 1,982 2,482 3,482
Product for processing (1,000 mt) 6,283 6,346 6,599 6,915 7,547
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ability of supply management to mitigate pro-
ducer losses stemming from an expansion of
the import quota. Under inelastic demand
conditions the ability of the industry to respond
to increased imports is restricted because of
the over-quota tariff. In addition, the choice
of demand elasticity used is critical with re-
spect to the relationship between supply man-
agement and the over-quota tariff. In scenarios
involving less elastic demand elasticities (20.1
and 20.3) the profit maximizing production
quota must be set in such a way as to support
priceup to a certain leveland yet notexceed the
price which triggers increased imports using
the over-quota tariff. The range of demand
elasticities used in this analysis is consistent
with demand elasticities used in previous stud-
ies and provides useful information, which in-
dustry and government can use in evaluating
this policy tool.
It is also important to note that while the
processing sector as a whole will benefit be-
cause the availability of sugar for processing
increases, the impact of individual components
of the sector will be mixed. Gains to integrated
and nonintegrated cane processors will be off-
set to some extent by losses to beet processors.
Future analysis should provide an empirical
counterpart to our previous discussion on the
impact of policy on the sugar processing sector.
Our empirical analysis focuses on the producer
sector only in that the rents calculated in this
analysis are of a Ricardian nature.
[Received April 2008; Accepted May 2009.]
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Calculation of Slopes and Intercepts
At the initial domestic price of U.S. $505.39 per mt
(22.92 cents per pound.), 9,079 thousand mt of sugar
is demanded in the U.S. market (Figure A1). This is
comprised of 7,597 thousand mt produced domesti-
cally and 1,482 thousand mt imported.
In the case of a demand elasticity of 20.6, the slope
of the demand curve (change in price over change in
quantity) is determined as follows:
Demand Slope 5 1 / (Demand Elasticity * Quantity
Demanded / Price)
or 1 / (20.6 * 9,079 / 505.39) 52 0.09278.
The price axis intercept for total demand is deter-
mined by:
Total Demand Intercept 5 Price – Demand Slope
* Total Quantity Demanded
or 505.39 – (20.09278 * 9,079) 5 1347.71.
The price axis intercept for domestic demand (total
demand less imports) is determined by:
Domestic Demand Intercept 5 Price – Demand
Slope * Domestic Quantity Demanded
or 505.39 – (20.09278 * 7,597) 5 1210.21.
In the case of a supply elasticity of 0.5, the slope of
the supply curve (change in price over change in
quantity) is determined as follows:
Supply Slope 5 1 /( Supply Elasticity * Quantity
Supplied / Price)
or 1 / (0.5 * 7,597 / 505.39) 5 0.13305.
The price axis intercept for domestic supply is de-
termined by:
Supply Intercept 5 Price – Supply Slope * Domestic
Quantity Supplied
or 505.39 – (0.13305 * 7,597) 52 505.39.
Supply slopes, demand slopes, and their respective in-
terceptsfordemandelasticitiesof20.1.20.3,and20.6,
and a supply elasticity of 0.5 are shown in Table A1.
Calculation of Producer and Consumer
Surplus
The producer surplus is the positive area above the
supply curve and below the domestic price, as rep-
resented by area D in Figure A1. In this case, in-
volvingatruncatedsupplycurve,theproducersurplus
does not include any of the area below the zero price
line. Producer surplus is determined by the equation:
Producer Surplus 5 Domestic Quantity Supplied
* (Price – Supply Intercept)/2
–( ( Supply Intercept / Supply Slope) * Supply
Intercept)/2
or 7,597 * (505.39 – (2505.39)) / 2 2 ((2505.39 /
0.13305) * (2505.39)) / 2 5 2,879,586.
In a similar fashion, the consumer surplus is deter-
mined by the equation:
Consumer Surplus 5 ((Domestic Quantity
Demanded 1 Import Quota)
*( Total Demand Intercept 2 Price)) / 2
or ((7,597 1 1,482) * (1347.71 2 505.39)) / 2 5
3,823,697.
Figure A1. Example of Supply and Demand Slopes and Intercepts and Producer and Consumer
Surplus with a Supply Elasticity of 0.5 and a Demand Elasticity of 20.6








20.1 20.55666 4734.32 5559.29
20.3 20.18555 1915.03 2190.02
20.6 20.09278 1210.21 1347.71
Supply Elasticity Slope Supply Price Intercept
0.5 0.13305 2505.39
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